Malacca Dilemma: A Knife On The Beijing’s Throat?
“Whoever is the lord of Malacca has his hands on the throat of Venice"
—Tome Pires, a 16th century Portuguese trader
The rise of China has sent shockwaves throughout the West. The world has never seen a nation’s such a sudden and dramatic rise to power. In just a little over 3 decades, China has pulled more than 800 million people out of poverty, causing it to become an economic and military power paralleled only by the United States. New alliances are being made and a new Great Game is being fought, but this time in the Indo-Pacific.
The story begins in 1976. Following Mao Zedong’s death, a number of abrupt political shifts occurred, which eventually resulted in Deng Xiaoping becoming China’s new leader. Deng steered China onto a course that has helped to transform it into the industrial powerhouse that it is today. This was made possible by Deng’s "Four Modernisations" and "Reform and Opening Up" policies. As a result, a new China was born out of an industrial revolution which followed. However, this prosperity is not without challenges. While China continues to be largely dependent on its own coal reserves and coal imports to meet its energy needs, there is also an increasing reliance on imported crude oil.
China surpassed the US to become the largest crude oil importer in the world in 2017, and 70% of this demand was met by importing oil, primarily from the West Asian region. China’s oil imports are predicted to increase by 15% over the next 20 years. Due to this very fact, China’s enormous and robust economy could falter and weaken if its oil supply were to decrease, not only would there be an industrial breakdown but also a negative impact on China’s overall credibility as a great power in the world, which is largely dependent on its economic strength. Energy security and oil supply in particular are therefore of utmost importance for China.
There are numerous important choke points along the marine route used to carry oil from West Asia to China. One of the most significant of them is the Malacca Strait, which accounts for 80% of China’s energy imports. This tiny strait is travelled by more than 50,000 merchant ships, or 40% of the world’s trade. As 60% of China’s trade value is transported by sea, the economic security of the country is intimately correlated with maritime trade security. The South China Sea is a region from where a large number of trading ships go to and from China carrying goods to and from Europe, Africa and the Middle East. The Malacca Strait is therefore vital to China’s economic interests.
The Malacca Strait, one of the most crucial shipping lanes in the world, is situated between the island of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula. It is a narrow stretch of water that connects the Indian and Pacific oceans. The Chinese government has previously been concerned that other big powers may be attempting to dominate the Strait because they depend on it just as much as China does. Anyone who controls the Strait of Malacca also indirectly controls the jaguar vein of the Chinese economy. This led to what is known as "The Malacca Dilemma," a term Hu Jintao, the Chinese president at the time, coined in 2003. The desire to dominate the Strait of Malacca itself is exceeded by the fear of other powers securing control of this vital strategic passageway.
In the years 2003–2004, there was a piracy concern in the area, which Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, were able to significantly reduce. However, this provided a chance for nations like the US and Japan to attempt a greater security-related involvement in the region, which China harshly criticized. The littoral state of Malaysia welcomed ‘capacity building’ efforts by the West. Excellent ties exist between the United States and Singapore, which is located at the southernmost point of the Malacca Strait. The USA and Indonesia too have cordial relations. Therefore, the increasing presence of the US and her allies is a direct threat to China’s economics lifeline.
ASEAN members have significant influence over how the Strait is managed. Following the threats posed by piracy and great power involvement, the ASEAN nations have sought to establish a Peace and Security Community (APSC) based on three essential elements: a "rule based community of shared values and norms," a "cohesive, peaceful, stable, and resilient region with "shared responsibility for comprehensive security," and a "dynamic and outward looking region in an integrated and interdependent world." But disagreements in territorial claims in the South China Sea have strained relations between China and many ASEAN nations. This has increased the urgency with which China must find a replacement for the Malacca Strait. Additionally, India, another regional rival of China and a member of anti-China Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(QUAD), has recently strengthened its naval presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a response to its perception of a danger from China’s "String of Pearls" policy to encircle India. The Indian Navy is also trying to keep a close eye on the PLA Navy in this region as part of New Delhi’s “Necklace of Diamond” doctrine to counter China’s String of Pearls.
Alternatives To The Straits of Malacca:
- Kra Isthmus Canal:
Additionally, India, another regional rival of China and a member of anti-China Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, has recently strengthened its naval presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a response to its perception of a danger from China’s "String of Pearls" policy to encircle India. The Indian Navy is also trying to keep a close eye on the PLA Navy in this region as part of New Delhi’s “Necklace of Diamond” doctrine to counter China’s String of Pearls.
2. Lombok Strait and Sundra Strait:
China can try longer routes like Lombok and Sundra Straits, but they too have a strong US presence. Additionally, these longer routes will annually coast more than 200billion USD, making them less economically beneficial.
3. CPEC And Gawadar-Xinjiang Pipeline
The Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is another option for Beijing that can completely avoid passing through the Malacca Strait and many other strategic choke points. Additionally, these options will help to open up China’s less developed provinces like Xinjiang and Yunnan. The Gwadar-Xinjiang line will make it possible for China to totally avoid using the Malacca Strait for its energy imports. However, due to the presence of some of the world’s harshest and most rocky terrains, which can be technically challenging as well as very expensive to travel, the pipeline in Pakistan faces significant logistical challenges. The area of Xinjiang in China and province of Balochistan in Pakistan are also rife with terrorist activities, which have the ability to disrupt supplies or, if the worst happens, control them and put them in a better bargaining position. All of these issues pose challenges for infrastructure and security initiatives. Moreover, the Indian presence in the strategically placed neighbouring Chabahar port in Iran may complicate matters for China.
4. CMEC And Myanmmar-Yunnan Pipeline :
Another option for China is the Kyaukpyu Port, which is being built in Myanmar by the Chinese government under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. The Myanmar-Yunnan pipeline can also be used to transport oil from the Middle East to China after it’s landing on Myanmar’s ports. Currently, the pipeline only moves 420,000 barrels per day as opposed to the 6.8 million barrels per day that are transported to China via the Strait of Malacca. This issue may be partially resolved by the acceleration of the China-sponsored infrastructure development as a result of the strengthening relations between the two nations, which were reinforced during Xi Jinping’s visit to Myanmar in January 2020. It cannot, however, boost this alternative’s capacity as much as the Malacca Strait.
5. Northern Sea Route:
With increasing climate change and global warming, the glaciers and frozen seas all around the world are melting more rapidly than ever. But in the words of Sun Tzu, " in the midst of chaos, there is an opportunity”—for China. China may use the usually frozen Northern Sea Route to trade with Russia bypassing the Straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean altogether. It may help Beijing to boost her trade, but for oil imports she will still be dependant on the Middle East. China can try to look towards Moscow for partially tackling her oil problem, but only Russian oil would not be enough for the gigantic Chinese industrial machine. Moreover, China and Russia, despite being rivals to the West, have historically been competitors in the region. From Beijing’s point of view, the anti-West alliance between Russia and China is temporary. China wants Russia to play a second fiddle in this alliance and that will not be possible if China relies too heavily on Moscow. The weaponzation of oil and gas by Putin in the ongoing Russian-Ukraine war is a manifestation of how much damage Russia can deliver to China if relations between both countries deteriorate. Thus, relying completely on Moscow will not be a top priority in Beijing.
Conclusion:
It is clear that there is no single replacement for the Malacca Strait. To maintain its enormous economic machine, China can rely on a number of different trade and energy routes. It should be highlighted that the Malacca Dilemma presents a conundrum because there are numerous alternatives, yet their efficacy cannot compare to that of the Malacca Strait. The best course of action available to China is to reduce hostilities in the Malacca Strait and find a peaceful means of cooperation.
